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Abstract 
Teams in the National Football League will do whatever it takes to win football 
games, even if that means having players with a criminal arrest history on their roster. 
However, does being arrested result in improved performance? Do NFL players with an 
arrest history perform better than those without one? I examine the effect a criminal arrest 
record has on player performance in the NFL from 2000-2014, using the top 30 ranked 
players within each position group. The position I chose to analyze were: Quarterbacks, 
Running Backs, Wide Receivers, Defensive Linemen, Linebackers, and Defensive Backs. 
My findings show that having an arrest record leads to better performance only with 
Defensive Linemen. Because of the various skill specialties and differences inherent in 
each position group, aggression and violence should be more important qualities among 
Defensive Linemen. Furthermore, I find evidence that players with an arrest record on 
average perform incrementally better than players who do not have a criminal arrest 
history. 
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I. Introduction 
 
“Just win baby, win”. This iconic phrase by late football coach, owner, and general 
manager of the Oakland Raiders, Al Davis, has served as a cornerstone slogan for the 
National Football League. NFL teams do whatever it takes to win games, whether it is 
scouting potential superstars, evaluating opposing teams, re-signing valuable players to 
their organization, or taking chances on athletes no other team would. However, a 
prominent issue in many professional sports, especially in the National Football League, 
is criminal violence and arrest history of its athletes. 
In a non-athletic labor market, criminal activity has great potential to affect the 
makeup of the company or corporation the employee works for. Many individuals who 
get arrested end up losing their job and have great difficulty finding another. In contrast, 
there are a great number of current NFL players with a criminal arrest history. Unlike 
general labor markets, the NFL is a setting in which having a criminal background is not 
as detrimental to the team or organization and that if you are good or valuable enough to 
your team, you will most likely be given a second chance either with the team you are on 
or with another team in the league. I would argue that in many cases within the context of 
the National Football League, arrests aren’t necessarily viewed as a bad thing. In fact, 
there are certain characteristics that might lead to certain types of criminal behavior that 
are seen as positive factors on the field. 
From the years 2000-2014, there have been over 800 arrest records of NFL 
players. Surprisingly, “one N.F.L. player in every 40 is arrested in a given year and 
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2.53% of players has had a serious run-in with the law in an average year” (Irwin 2014). 
There is a huge perception by the general public that the NFL has a major crime problem 
that desperately needs to be fixed. Many NFL arrests tend to make front page news and 
bring negative attention to the NFL. In 2007 ex-Falcons Quarterback, Michael Vick, was 
indicted for animal cruelty and dog-fighting charges. Arguably the most notable and 
widely publicized arrest involved ex-Patriots Tight-End, Aaron Hernandez, who was 
charged with murder. Just recently in September of 2015, ex-49ers Linebacker, Aldon 
Smith, was also arrested and charged with driving under the influence, hit-and-run, 
property damage, and vandalism. 
While these are all issues I believe need to be fixed, the goal of my analysis is to 
determine whether an arrest record affects NFL player performance. I base my analysis 
and define an arrest record/criminal history as any offense worse than a simple speeding 
ticket. While I do not differentiate between the types of crimes or offenses in my 
regression analysis, it is interesting to distinguish and identify the most common charges 
N.F.L. players face from the years 2000-2014. (The preceding figures include all player 
positions, not just the ones I use in my analysis and regression models. The charges from 
highest frequency of arrests to lowest frequencies (with number of arrests in parentheses) 
include: (202) Driving under the influence, (88) Assault and battery, (85) Domestic 
Violence, (82) Drugs, (43) Disorderly Conduct, (38) Gun-related charges, (35) Alcohol-
related (excluding D.U.I.), and (21) Burglary/Theft (Figure 1).  As you can see in Figure 
1, the most common criminal offense is that of driving while drunk, while domestic abuse 
consistently remains a huge issue, even before the increased media coverage surrounding 
the spousal domestic abuse case of Ray Rice, an extremely successful Running Back that 
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was released from the Baltimore Ravens. While some of these types of arrests may have 
smaller effects on player game performance than others, I find it important to include 
them all in an aggregate amount to better understand the impact a criminal arrest record 
of any sort has on player performance across the league. 
I believe some of these types of behaviors are extremely valuable and attributable 
to increased levels of game performance, most evident within the context of defensive 
players (Defensive Linemen, linebackers, Defensive Backs). The behaviors that are most 
relevant when looking at characteristics of certain NFL player positions include 
aggression, toughness, and intensity. 
All of the above factors are seen as positive attributes for defensive players 
because the focus of playing defense is to inflict pain and assert dominance over the 
opposing offensive players, stopping them in their tracks and preventing them from 
moving the ball forward or scoring points. It is almost impossible to succeed in these 
aspects if the player is not aggressive, tough, or fails to assert his dominance over the 
opposing player across the line of scrimmage from them.  For offensive players, I argue 
that criminal arrest records have less of a positive effect on game performance due to the 
nature of the positions I will analyze (Quarterbacks, Running Backs, and Wide 
Receivers). These positions require much less aggression and their game performance 
success is highly contingent on more cohesive offensive unit play. I believe because of 
the variations of defenses in the NFL, offensive players require more film study, analysis 
of coverages and blitzes, and are less reliant on simple aggression and violence towards 
opposing players, and even trying to hurt other players. The greater variety of defenses an 
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offensive player sees throughout the season, the more he has to adapt to the changing 
landscapes of NFL defensive structures and philosophy. This requires a greater amount of 
film study and analysis of player tendencies because of the defensive differences 
throughout the league. 
Based on these facts and personal opinions, I predict that an arrest record is 
correlated to poorer performance for positions that heavily favor intelligence and a high 
“football IQ”, including Quarterbacks, Running Backs, and Wide Receivers. I predict that 
an arrest record is more associated with higher performance for Defensive positions 
where aggression and toughness are more valuable attributes, which include Defensive 
Lineman, Linebackers, and Defensive Backs. Overall, I predict NFL Offensive players 
with a criminal arrest record perform worse than offensive players who do not have an 
arrest record, while NFL Defensive players with a criminal arrest record perform better 
than defensive players who do not have an arrest record. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Economics of Crime: 
Before discussing the effect of criminal arrest records on NFL player 
performance, it is crucial to first look at the economics and incentives of crime on a more 
macro level. More specifically, I will focus my attention on non-athletic labor markets. 
Freeman (1999) displays the role of incentives in criminal decisions. He highlights the 
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“difficulty of reducing crime through incapacitation: when the elasticity of supply to 
crime is high, one criminal replaces another in the market; and thus the importance of 
deterring crime by altering behavior” (p. 3530). In the NFL however, it is clear that more 
attention and criticism by the media and general population is cast upon athletes who 
commit crimes because they are in the spotlight. Freeman derived a model in which we 
can see whether individuals choose between criminal activity and legal activity based on 
expected utility of these actions. But what is the root cause of criminal decisions? 
Freeman argues that it could be a result of poor legitimate labor market opportunities of 
potential criminals. This would mean low hourly pay and high unemployment rates are 
some of the main determinants of crime. This research also implies that men with below 
average skill and educational levels who commit crime can receive higher pay from 
criminal activities than from legal legitimate activities. Freeman uses an Expected Return 
On Crime (EROC) model to show the impact committing a crime with friends, or even 
similar individuals with common characteristics of the criminal, can have on the 
probability of criminal activity. If Wc is the gain from crime, p is the probability of being 
apprehended, S the extent of punishment, and W is earnings from legitimate work, then 
crime will be committed instead of legitimate work when: 
(1-p)U(Wc) – pU(S) > U(W) 
However, three implications exist: 
1. Successful crime must pay a higher wage than legitimate activities 
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2. Attitudes towards risk will influence the decision to commit crime; risk averse 
individuals will respond greater to changes in apprehension risks than to changes 
in punishment extent 
3. The major factors that affect decisions on whether or not to commit the crime 
(criminal vs. legitimate earnings, chances of being caught and sentencing extent) 
are all intrinsically related. 
The above model is based on probability and the idea that there is actually an 
effective return on crime that is more desirable and beneficial than honest behavior and 
work. While this model is a hypothetical economic model of decision-making, it is 
interesting to note that the equation includes and highlights the major variables in which 
most empirical economic studies focus their attention on. Freeman further explains that 
“given the same expected return from crime, you may be more likely to commit crime if 
your peers commit crime than if they do not” (pg. 3549). This means that one’s decision 
to commit a crime can greatly affect the decision of others to commit a similar crime. 
This could be seen as a parallel to similar types of professional athletes getting arrested 
for similar types of crimes professional athletes commit (driving under the influence, 
domestic abuse, drug charges, etc.). Also, very dissimilar from NFL player salaries, 
criminals have lower earnings prospects than those who do not commit crimes. The best 
way to show this disparity between labor markets is analyzing the salary of a current NFL 
Defensive Back with a criminal arrest record and comparing it to an NFL Defensive Back 
without a criminal arrest history. Adam “Pacman” Jones of the Cincinnati Bengals signed 
a three year, $5,350,000 contract even after being arrested for various charges, including: 
assault, drug possession, disorderly conduct, etc. However, current cornerback for the 
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New York Jets, Darrin Walls, makes $950,000 a year even though he does not have a 
criminal background. This shows a clear and large disparity between the effect a criminal 
arrest record has on earnings when looking at normal labor markets and that of the 
National Football League. 
An earlier study by Grogger (1995) further expands on the effect arrests and 
criminal records have on overall employment and earnings figures of young men of 
similar ages to newly drafted NFL players. Grogger uses an empirical econometric model 
to show that (1) arrests and prosecution should affect both current and future labor market 
outcomes, and (2) should exploit the longitudinal structure of the data to provide controls 
and explanations for unobserved variables that correlate with arrests and their effect on 
future earnings in a labor market. The model proved to be consistent with Grogger’s 
hypothesis that arrests and criminal activity decreases future earnings. Those that are 
arrested more than once in a given quarter/period experience an additional decrease in 
estimated earnings whereas the effect an arrest has on employment is also negative. 
However, Grogger concludes his study stating “the effects of arrests on employment and 
earnings are moderate in magnitude and are rather short-lived” and that declining wages 
among our nation’s younger generations, in conjunction with improved criminal activity 
benefit prospects (especially in the illegal drug market), provides strong incentives to 
commit crime at the expense of working in a legitimate market (pg. 70). 
Schmitt and Warner (2010) provide a more modern analysis on ex-criminals and 
their impact on the overall general labor market in the United States. In terms of 
employment rates, they found that “ex-offenders lower employment rates for men by 1.5-
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1.7 percentage points” and even at relatively low productivity rates of ex-offenders, the 
resulting loss of GDP/output that year was likely somewhere between $57 and $65 billion 
(pg. 1). Schmitt and Warner also believe this negative trend will continue in coming years 
and that output will steadily decrease substantially over time. The results of their study 
show that felony convictions, or any convictions for that matter, can have a substantial 
negative impact on job prospects. This is in large part because of the heightened 
probability of “deterioration of worker ‘human capital’, including formal education, on-
the-job experience, and even “soft skills” such as punctuality or customer relations” (pg. 
8). 
It is important to point out that this study argued that many ex-prisoners and ex-
felons struggled in the labor market before their arrests and convictions, so it is an 
interesting topic that I find few similarities with when making comparisons to the 
National Football League. This is most likely due to the greater weight NFL teams place 
on talent rather than on an arrest history or character concerns. This is blatantly obvious 
when looking through recent media and news articles of current NFL players having 
multiple arrests and continuing their careers in the NFL either on the same team, or 
another team willing to take the risk of employing them. 
Athlete Aggression and Violence In Sports: 
While there is a plethora of implications for crime and arrests on the overall labor 
market in the United States, I focus my study and research on why athletes throughout 
sports engage in criminal behavior. 
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In professional sports such as Football, Ice Hockey, Mixed Martial Arts, etc., 
talent and aggressiveness are important traits an athlete must possess in order to excel in 
their respective sport. Most blatantly seen in Ice Hockey, there is a position designated to 
be extremely aggressive and fight other members of the opposing team. The “Enforcer” is 
known for reacting “harshly to violence”, and that those “fighting skills can help a less-
talented or smaller player in the league when their hockey skills alone would not” 
(Wikipedia). 
Zimmerman (2013) further explains and expands on this inherently violent and 
aggressive behavior by including a quote by Roger Dangerfield in the beginning of his 
study: “I went to a fight and a hockey game broke out”. More generally, the National 
Hockey League uses violence and aggressive play in order to maximize profits and 
increase fan numbers and game attendance. Many athletic spectators enjoy violence on 
the ice just as much as team success. Furthermore, Zimmerman uses the following 
regression model in his study to explain the relationship between certain attributes and 
their effect on a player’s salary: 
Salary: β0 + β1PPG + β2TOIPG + β3Enforcer 
This equation states that salary is a function of a constant (β0), points per game, 
time on ice per game, and a dummy variable that classifies enforcers (1 for enforcer; 0 if 
not an enforcer). His results showed that all three variables have positive coefficients 
meaning it positively correlates with a player’s salary. More specifically, if the team 
believes the enforcer-type player has adequate skills to fulfill that role, the “player’s 
salary can increase 485,960 dollars” (pg. 55), which shows a clear incentive for increased 
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aggression and violence on the ice. Most importantly, the positive coefficient for the 
β3Enforcer variable shows that team’s see the value of being an enforcer to be positive 
attribute and characteristic of their team. 
Jensen, Roman, Shaft, and Wrisberg (2013) further explore the impact and benefit 
of having an extremely aggressive and violent nature towards an opponent, as well as 
how it almost always correlates positively with individual success. They discovered the 
phenomenon of “cage reality” (pg. 6), in which being inside of a cage is completely 
different than being outside of the cage, and that aggression towards the opposition is 
normal and necessary once an individual is in the cage. This idea draws many similarities 
with professional football players on the football field and hockey players in the rink. 
They also explore the idea that violence can be a viable solution “when tasks become 
more important than people (winning and injuring someone versus losing and not injuring 
someone)” (pg. 6). 
My thesis examines the effect a criminal arrest record has on in-game 
performance in the National Football League. Stevens (2012) looks at this idea from a 
different perspective by analyzing the relationship between being a male-athlete and the 
chances for off-field violence and criminal activity. In 2009, young-adult males between 
the age of 15-19 and 20-24 were arrested for violent crime at a rate of 730.3 and 667.5 
respectively per 100,000 people (pg. 3). Stevens analyzed traditional masculine 
ideologies society imposes on males at a young age, stressing the importance of 
manliness, and that those with the strongest characteristics of masculinity would be 
rewarded greater later on in his life. Stevens also acknowledges that our community as a 
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whole values an athlete’s willingness to successfully use violence in a sports context, 
making it seem as if it is a normative behavior. This emphasis can be seen not only as a 
major concern and current threat for our society currently, but also for the future path our 
society takes in the future. 
Character Concern Effects on NFL Draft Stock: 
I have a strong belief that professional athletic labor markets are much different 
than the general labor market in terms of overall employment and job retention. Daly 
(2014) dives deeper into this idea by looking within the scope of the NFL Draft and a 
player’s draft stock. Daly argues that the economic labor market should follow the same 
guidelines as the NFL in terms of placing a higher and more weighted emphasis on the 
prospective athlete’s potential success with the firm or company rather than placing too 
much emphasis on the criminal arrest history. 
Weir (2012) takes this analysis a step further by looking at the effects character 
concerns (mainly arrest records and team suspensions) have on draft status and 
performance in the NFL, instead of just focusing on NFL players. There is not a great 
deal of current research concerning the effects a criminal arrest history has on a player’s 
draft status, so it is important to take this fact into consideration when looking at the 
bigger picture of current NFL player performance. For example, an extremely talented 
player could have a very tainted arrest record and could be drafted in the sixth or seventh 
rounds of the draft, and be signed by a team that will fail to maximize his talent because 
of preconceived notions of character. Weir found that teams tend to undervalue 
prospective players with criminal arrest records while overvaluing those without an arrest 
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history. Weir argues that draft status is mainly predicted by NFL Combine results at three 
positions (Running Backs, Wide Receivers and Defensive Backs) (pg.4) rather than 
putting more weight on factors such as the type of team they played on, success in 
college, strength of their conference their team played in, etc. Ironically, these are the 
position groups in my models and data sets that have the greatest number of arrests 
compared to any other positions, which gives rise to possible explanations  of disparities 
and interesting discussion. To determine the effect character issues have on NFL draft 
status, Weir used the following regression model: 
OP = β0 + β1Character + β2X + ε 
where OP is each player’s overall pick in the draft, and Character is a dummy variable 
for players who had an arrest or were suspended for at least one game during their college 
careers. X represents a vector of player and school characteristics and also serves as a 
variable for varying player positions. ε represents a random error figure. In order to 
determine whether or not these character concerns affect player performance once they 
get to the National Football League, Weir used the following regression model: 
Perform = β0 + β1Arrest_No_Charge + β2 Arrest_Charge + β1Suspend + β2X + ε 
where Perform represents a particular measure of NFL player performance. A weakness 
of this model however, is that it does not account for the fact that some of the players that 
have been arrested may not still be playing in the NFL. It also fails to account for serious 
injuries that could severely affect performance measurements after returning from an 
injury. Weir’s results show that players with a history of character concerns are taken 
later in the draft. But when looking at these factors in terms of player performance, there 
13 
 
is no statistical significant correlation to game performance. Weir concludes that having a 
“history of conflict with coaches and teammates usually predicts future on-the-field 
difficulties, but off field behavior does not negatively impact game performance” (pg. 
18). Weir also states that while criminal backgrounds are not as detrimental to labor 
market outcomes initially, there is still labor discrimination when looking within the 
context of the NFL Draft. 
Athletes Compared to General Population: 
There is a constant discussion regarding professional athletes and their criminal 
arrest history, most notably with professional football players in the National Football 
League. This is likely attributable to the vast majority and shear number of athletes on a 
professional football team compared to other sports, as well as the growing attention and 
media presence of the National Football League. Many members of our society tend to 
believe professional athletes have higher frequencies of arrests compared to the general 
population. To test this idea, Blumstein (2010) conducted a study where he compared 
NFL players to individuals of similar age and comparable income. He found that the rate 
of arrests for NFL players is below that of the general population. Even when looking at 
NFL players who make their living through exercising their physical abilities and 
strength, they still have a lower arrest compared to the general population. Piquero (2015) 
also came to the same conclusion when looking at data spanning over a fourteen year 
period. In 2013, the arrest rate for the general population was 4,889 arrests per 100,000 
people, compared to 3,740 arrests per 100,000 people for NFL players (Figure 5). 
Piquero attributed this misconception to the media, stating that “in our instantaneous 
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world right now, you see a video, you see a tweet and it becomes real” and that “one 
image of one person does not necessarily characterize every single player” in the NFL. 
Other Topics to Explore: 
Special Treatment and Redemption: 
Another interesting debate regarding professional athletes is the concept of special 
treatment when facing punishment, as well as the idea of redemption. There is a 
conspiracy theory believed to be attributable to many of the premier players in the NFL, 
stating that these athletes are not given the same punishment as the general population for 
their crimes and that they are treated differently by law enforcement simply because of 
their social status and image in the sporting world. Withers (2015) explores this idea of 
special treatment and lack of consequences of professional athletes as a whole when they 
are violent off the field. Most notably in her discussion, she addresses how Ray Rice was 
able to return to the Baltimore Ravens while an investigation was pending, which 
involved Ray Rice punching his then fiancé unconscious in an elevator followed by him 
dragging her body out of the elevator. Rice was given a second chance due to the penalty 
being seen as “arbitrary” and too severe because he had previously admitted his wrong-
doing to NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell.  Withers also found that in the MLB, NFL, 
and NBA, that only one of the 64 reported allegations resulted in a conviction, only seven 
players were actually punished by their respective league, and only two players were 
punished by their individual team in 2014. 
More specifically within the context of the NFL, current starting Quarterback of 
the Pittsburg Steelers, Ben Roethlisberger, made headlines when he was accused of 
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sexual assault against a college student. It is also important to note that he had previously 
been accused of sexual assault on three separate occasions before this new highly 
publicized incident. It was reported during the investigation that the officer conducting 
the interviews with Roethlisberger took photos with him and was reported saying the 
accuser was drunk and that the officer took Roethlisberger’s side during the investigation. 
Shockingly, Withers found that there haven’t been any convictions of professional 
athletes for sexual assault from the years 2010-2014. While this may be a result of a 
variety of different things, special treatment of athletes and their interactions with the law 
will always be a widely debated topic. 
The concept of professional athlete redemption also gives rise to much 
controversy and debate. There seems to be a tendency by the NFL to give players second 
chances under the condition they are talented enough, can still salvage/maintain a 
positive NFL image, or can still generate revenue for the NFL. This is an enormous social 
problem with our society as a whole. From my own personal experience, male athletes 
from a very young age tend to get special treatment and second chances more so than 
non-athletes. The blame is rarely placed on the athlete and the phrase “boys will be boys” 
becomes more commonly and widely used. When looking at this idea in the general labor 
market, if an individual makes a serious mistake or commits a crime, they tend to not 
have a job after the incident. In the NFL however, if a player commits a crime, he is 
suspended, benched, traded, or cut, all of which give plenty of opportunities for the 
athlete to maintain their job and status in the NFL as long as they are good enough to 
remain in the league. Rarely ever is the athlete banned form the NFL. 
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An interesting parallel to this idea of redemption in sports can also be seen in 
Russian literature. Dostoevsky’s critically acclaimed novel, Crime and Punishment 
contains elements of redemption and the concept of a second chance. In the novel, the 
main character Raskolnikov commits a double murder and struggles to find redemption 
and meaning throughout the entirety of the novel. The author suggests redemption is not 
easily achieved, but when it finally is achieved, an individual can feel energized and be 
better off physically and emotionally than they were before their immoral action or crime. 
Raskolnikov sees himself as above the moral rules of Russian law and humanity (similar 
to what society thinks of some elite NFL players) and that redemption is only achieved 
through suffering or punishment. 
When comparing this idea to a professional athlete or NFL player, this can be 
seen as a player facing negative media coverage, being arrested for short periods of time, 
or even being cut from a team after an arrest. The athlete in most cases is given chances 
to “redeem” himself by performing well in games after his punishment or is given a 
second chance for glory with another team in the league. Unfortunately in our modern 
society, NFL players tend to find redemption fairly easily. It seems as if the majority of 
sins or crimes committed by NFL athletes tend to be forgiven as long as their game 
performance is up to par or as long as they remain positive and gain favorable media 
coverage after their incident. This can be seen in Crime and Punishment as Raskolnikov 
strives to receive redemption after the murders, similar to the trial of Ray Lewis, ex-
linebacker for the Baltimore Ravens. Many people forget that in the beginning of Lewis’ 
career he was arrested and faced multiple charges, most notably murder. When the case 
ended in is favor, he managed to evolve and eventually become a hall-of-fame caliber 
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player who is well respected and idolized by many NFL fans and spectators. Media 
coverage portrayed Lewis as a God and a great leader of the Baltimore Ravens defense, 
instead of in a negative light. These examples show how prevalent the theme of 
redemption is in the NFL even with the presence of a troubled past, such as a criminal 
arrest record. 
The Goal of the NFL – Protecting its Image: 
The goal of the NFL has always remained the same throughout its conception: 
increase revenue, increase the total number of fans, and maintain a classy organization 
regardless of fan pressure or changing societal landscapes. NFL player arrests greatly 
hinder this NFL objective, but have the potential in some cases to improve it. Gregory 
(2013) reported that in 2013, the off-season arrest rate for NFL players is up 75% year-
over-year” but “is much lower than the national arrest rate for men ages 22 to 34: 3.5% 
since 2003 compared to 9.9% for all men aged 22 to 34”. This statistic would be 
surprising to most people if they gave themselves a chance to hear it, but it is often 
overlooked because of the microscope the media places on players when they commit a 
crime or wrongdoing. So, how should the NFL solve the problem of increased off-season 
arrests? Many ideas have circulated NFL front offices, but one idea that was proposed 
included economic incentives for good conduct. This would mean that if a team as a 
whole stayed out of trouble, their team would be granted higher picks in the draft, 
increased salaries, or increases in team salary cap. 
Another way the NFL tries to maintain its image and pursue its goals is by further 
limiting the amount of criminals inducted into the Pro Football Hall of Fame. Eddie 
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DeBartolo Jr. is an athlete under Hall of Fame consideration. However, it is reported that 
he was involved with political corruption in Louisiana that is currently keeping him out 
of contention (Weiner 2014). However, there currently is a large amount of athletes in the 
NFL Hall of Fame with criminal arrest records, including all-time greats O.J. Simpson 
and Lawrence “L.T.” Taylor. While there is not a majority of Hall of Famers with an 
arrest record, it is one way the NFL attempts to regulate some aspects of player behavior 
and maintain its image. Society as a whole worries that if someone from within their 
community commits a crime, it tarnishes the entire community’s image and downgrades 
their society morally, as well as socially. Specifically in the NFL, the Cincinnati Bengals 
have been notorious for hiring and drafting criminals on their team, which in large part 
has tarnished their image more so than other teams in the NFL. I believe public opinion 
can also play a huge role in the NFL draft in the sense that the fans and media could 
greatly influence NFL front offices and coaches to decide to draft different players they 
normally would not have drafted or considered otherwise. 
 
IV. Model and Methodology 
 
In my research approach, I will use multiple models and regressions to better 
measure performance and see the effect an arrest record has on individual positions in the 
National Football League. For my statistical analysis and performance evaluations, I have 
pulled data from the NFL.com website using the top thirty ranked players in each position 
for the years 2000-2014. I also have compiled an arrest database listing all arrest records 
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for NFL players in the same time period. I will use different performance metrics when 
looking at offensive and defensive positions due to the nature and inherent differences of 
each position. 
Offensive Positions: 
I decided not to include Offensive Lineman, Tight Ends, or Fullbacks in my 
analysis because these positions have weak data and widespread results, and are highly 
dependent on the team they are on and the philosophy and coaching style of their team’s 
offensive personnel. For example, many teams do not frequently use the fullback position 
in the National Football League anymore due to the increased prevalence of passing more 
frequently in regular season games and the growing popularity of the spread offense. 
Tight-ends in the NFL are also hard to measure performance because some teams 
emphasize blocking Tight Ends, while others emphasize the use of receiver type Tight 
Ends. Also, it is incredibly hard to accurately measure Offensive Linemen performance 
individuals since they tend to be ranked and evaluated as an entire group instead of 
individually. In addition, the sample sizes of these various offensive positions (in terms 
of criminal arrest records) are too small to sufficiently draw relevant and significant 
conclusions from. 
I acknowledge that there is a wide variety of alternatives measures for evaluating 
player performance, but I will be placing higher emphasis on certain variables based off 
of my own analysis and experience playing and watching the sport of football. Also, I 
believe that the current metrics used to evaluate offensive player performance in the NFL 
has many weaknesses. Overall, players will tend to respond and place higher value on 
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certain metrics more than others. For example, Running Backs may tend to place a higher 
emphasis on overall rushing yards and touchdowns, even though most commonly used 
performance metrics for that position do not take into account fumbles in their models, 
which can be seen as a serious weakness in a player’s performance arsenal. Even if the 
metric is irrelevant in the grand scheme of a football game, it is important to realize that 
players still have a tendency to respond to those metrics. 
Quarterbacks: 
In my analysis of Quarterback performance, I include other variables with the 
widely-used Quarterback Rating (QBR) measurement, in order to better estimate the 
characteristics of a successful quarterback in the National Football League. While the 
current QBR system is widely used and valued today, it has a variety of shortcomings 
inherent in its calculation that I believe fail to accurately account or measure 
performance. The current QBR method has four parts that contribute to the final rating: 
• Percentage of Completions 
o Subtract 30 from completion percentage, multiply that result by 0.05 
o If < 0, award 0 points 
o If >2.375, award 2.375 points 
• Average yards Gained Per Attempt 
o Divide passing yards by the number of attempts 
o Subtract three yards from yards/attempt and multiply result by 0.25. 
o If < 0, award 0 points 
o If >2.375, award 2.375 points 
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• Percentage of Touchdown passes 
o Divide number of touchdowns by amount of attempts 
o Multiply touchdown percentage by 0.2 
o If > 2.375, award 2.375 points 
• Percentage of Interceptions 
o Divide number of interceptions by number of attempts 
o Multiply that percentage by 0.25 and subtract that number from 2.375 
o If < 0, award zero points 
Now, the QBR rating adds the results of Steps 1-4, then divides the result by 6, 
followed by multiplying the result by 100. In the case of this current QBR formula, it can 
be used for a passer who completes at least one pass, which I believe is a serious flaw in 
the model because it fails to account for the possibility a Quarterback throws a single 
completion on one attempt, and happens to score. I propose a new method by adding in 
additional variables in my regression analysis to more accurately measure Quarterback 
performance including: Games Played, Sacks Allowed, and Arrest Record. 
My rationale behind this adjusted QBR is due to three things. First, QBR does not 
account for a quarterback who got injured during the season and missed games, or has 
possibly faced a suspension or playing time adjustment. Second, Sacks Allowed is a very 
important statistic in football performance evaluations because a Quarterback who holds 
on to the ball too long and gives up a sack results in a negative play, compared to if the 
Quarterback had the ability to throw the ball out of bounds or intentionally throw an 
incomplete pass to prevent a loss of yardage. And third, similar to what was previously 
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stated, being arrested can drastically alter a QBR rating due to possible suspensions, 
missed games, or can greatly affect the performance of an NFL Quarterback trying to 
stay focused in a game. QBR is also based on data from statistics dating back to the 
1960’s and 1970’s, and I believe the NFL has experienced and continues to experience a 
constantly changing style of play. Also, in the current QBR measurement system, by 
looking at completion percentage after looking at yards per attempt, you are accounting 
for completions twice. The adjusted QBR regression model that I use to evaluate 
Quarterback performance is defined as: 
QBRACADJ = β0QBRNFL + β1GPQB - β2SAQB - β3ArrestedQB 
where QBRACADJ  is QBR including my additions to the regression model. QBRNFL 
represents the QBR the National Football League currently uses, GPQB defining the 
number of games played by a Quarterback during the season, and SAQB representing the 
total number of times a Quarterback was sacked during a season. Lastly, included in all 
of my regression models, the last variable in every regression I use, Arrested, serves as 
the dummy variable that determines whether or not the player has been arrested. 
Unlike the  regression models I will use for the other offensive positions, I have 
not included the  player rank variable in my Quarterback regression model due to its 
subjectivity and the fact that it fails to take into consideration the additional variables I 
have added in for Quarterback performance model. For all of the independent variables, I 
predict that increases in Quarterback Rating and Games Played positively correlate with 
game performance. I also predict Sacks and Arrests negatively correlates with 
performance and Quarterback Rating. Being sacked as a quarterback drastically affects 
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performance metrics because of a Quarterback’s inability to make quick decisions, throw 
the ball out of bounds to move on to another down, or his inability to sufficiently read 
defenses in the National Football League. 
Running Backs: 
For the Running Back position, my analysis and variables are much simpler and 
have much less subjectivity when evaluating performance and the effect being arrested 
has on player performance. The model I use to evaluate Running Back performance is 
defined as: 
RkRB = β0Att/GRB + β1Yds/GRB + β2TDRB - β3FumRB + β4GPRB - β5ArrestedRB 
where RkRB represents the end of year position rank of the Running Back position. 
Att/GRB defines the number of attempts a Running Back has per game, while Yds/GRB 
represents the number of yards per game a Running Back has. TDRB describes the 
number of touchdowns a Running Back has in a single season while FumRB includes the 
total number of fumbles a Running Back gives up in a single season. Lastly, GPRB 
identifies the number of games a Running Back has played in during a given season. 
I only used end of season outcome variables for touchdowns, fumbles, and games 
played. This is because these metrics are better measurements of in-game performance 
and give less leeway for large differences and discrepancies in my Running Back 
performance model I will use. For example, a Running Back may have four carries and 
four touchdowns in a single game. This can be attributable to only having this Running 
Back run the ball when the offense is in the red-zone (within the opponent’s 20 yard 
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line). There are also situations in which this same Running Back can have a negative 
rushing yard amount in a game. For example, when Jerome Bettis (ex-Steelers RB) 
played in his last Super Bowl, he at various points in the game had more than one 
touchdown, but also had negative net rushing yards because he was tackled multiple 
times behind the line of scrimmage. 
I believe looking at attempts and yards per game eliminates this shortcoming and 
more accurately depicts Running Back performance. Also, by not looking at total yardage 
figures for Running Backs, it eliminates the aberrations some Running Backs have when 
they have an incredible rushing game one week, and perform poorly the following week. 
It is also important to note that the addition of games played allows for further and more 
concise analysis when looking at performance and measuring whether or not end of 
season outcomes correlate with the amount of games the athlete has actually played in 
(taking into account the possibility of suspensions, injury, etc.). 
Among all of the independent variables, I predict that increases in Attempts per 
Game, Yards per Game, Touchdowns, and Games Played positively correlate with higher 
Running Back rankings. However, I predict that increases in Fumbles and Arrests 
negatively correlates with game performance due to the effect turnovers have on the 
game, as well as any possibility of scoring points for the offense on that drive. 
Wide Receivers: 
For the Wide Receiver position, similar to the Running Back position, my 
analysis and variables are much easier to analyze and are less likely to be subjective 
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when I evaluate performance and the effect being arrested has on game performance. The 
model I use to evaluate Wide Receiver game performance is defined as: 
RkWR = β0Rec/GWR + β1Yds/GWR + β2TDWR - β3FumWR + β4GPWR - β5ArrestedWR 
where RkWR represents the end of year position rank of the Wide Receiver position. 
Rec/GWR defines the number of receptions a Wide Receiver has per game, while 
Yds/GWR represents the number of yards per game a Wide Receiver has. TDWR describes 
the total number of touchdowns a Wide Receiver has in a single season while FumWR 
includes the total number of fumbles a Wide Receiver gives up in a single season. Lastly, 
GPWR identifies the number of games the Wide Receiver has played in in a given season. 
For the Wide Receiver position, similar to that of Running Backs, the only end of 
season variables used in my regression model were touchdowns, fumbles, and games 
played. While it may not be as beneficial to look at these metrics alone, at the end of the 
day society continues using these figures as a gauge for measuring Running Back and 
Wide Receiver performance. 
Among the independent variables for the Wide Receiver position, I predict 
Receptions per Game, Yards per Game, Touchdowns, and Games Played positively 
correlate with Wide Receiver Rankings. I also predict that Fumbles and Arrests 
negatively correlate with player rankings, which is similar to what was previously stated 
in the previous player section. 
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Defensive Positions: 
Unlike the offensive positions, I will use different performance evaluation metrics 
because while there are numerous ways to independently evaluate offensive players, it is 
much harder to do on the defensive side of the ball. For example, it would be irrational to 
compare total interceptions of a Defensive Back to the total interceptions of a Defensive 
Lineman or Nose-Guard simply because of positional and situational differences in a 
defensive scheme, whether it is a 3-4 scheme, 4-3 scheme, Tampa 2 scheme, etc. So, I 
will use WPA, +WPA, EPA, +EPA, and EPA/G, and TF metrics to more accurately 
evaluate in-game performance and to better compare defensive players to each other with 
and without the presence of an arrest history. 
In all of my defensive player performance evaluations, I use the Win Probability 
Added (WPA) and the Expected Points Added (EPA) variables. WPA represents the 
difference between a team’s Win Probability (WP) at the beginning of a play and the WP 
by the end of the play. This variable measures a play’s impact on the outcome of a game. 
A player’s WPA measures the play’s impact on the game’s overall outcome and is the 
sum of the WPA of the plays in which the player was directly involved (catch, tackle, 
completion, etc.). Defensive players are credited for WPA for events such as making a 
tackle, sacking the Quarterback, causing a fumble, etc. 
+WPA is limited to only the net positive values for his team. It is a measure of a 
defender’s impact on the outcome of fames in terms of play-making ability. Only positive 
plays are included because solid individual plays can still result in a net loss in WPA. For 
example, a touchdown saving tackle twenty yards past the line of scrimmage would result 
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in a negative value even though the defensive player denied the offensive player six 
points. This metric usually correlates well with WPA. EPA represents the difference 
between expected points (EP) at the start of a play and the EP by the end of the play. This 
measurement relates to a play’s impact on the final score of the game. One way to 
measure expected impact per play is: EPA = EP1 – EP0. 
+EPA is attributed to a defensive player in which his plays are net positive values 
for his team. Similar to +WPA, it is a measure of a defender’s impact on the game score 
in terms of play-making ability and that only positive plays are considered because some 
defensive plays can result in net losses in EPA (same as above). Overall, individual EPA 
usually correlates well with +EPA. Another variable in my regression model is EPA/G, 
which measures EPA on a per-game basis.  Similar to the offensive regression model, I 
included Games Played and Arrested as additional independent variables. Throughout all 
of the defensive regression models, I predict that WPA, EPA, EPA/G, Arrested, as well 
as my added-in variables all positively correlate with higher player rankings. 
TF, which stands for Tackle Factor, is the ratio of a player’s proportion of his 
team’s tackles to what is expected at his position. For example, “a middle linebacker in a 
4-3 defensive scheme typically make 11.9% of their team’s tackles, so a middle 
linebacker who made 12.6% of his team’s tackles would have a TF of 1.06” (Glossary – 
Advanced Football Analytics). The TF is adjusted for a full season, not including 
playoffs, which would be irrational to include since a majority of players in the rankings 
do not end up going to playoffs. 
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Defensive Linemen: 
For all of the following defensive positions, my regression models are much less 
subjective in terms of evaluating player performance in the NFL. The model I use to 
evaluate Defensive Linemen game performance and the effect an arrest record has on 
game performance is defined as: 
RkDL = β0WPADL + β1EPADL + β2EPA/GDL + β3TFDL + β4GPDL + β5ArrestedDL 
A new additional variable I chose to include in the Defensive Linemen regression model 
is GPDL, which represents the number of Games Played by a Defensive Lineman in a 
season. I predict that increases in all of the independent variables in this regression 
equation positively correlates with player rank and higher performance. 
Linebackers: 
The model I use to evaluate Linebacker game performance is defined as: 
RkLB = β0WPALB + β1EPALB + β2EPA/GLB + β3TFLB + β4INTLB + β5GPLB + β6ArrestedLB 
A new additional variable I chose to include in the Linebacker regression model is 
INTLB, which represents the number of interceptions made by a linebacker.  I predict 
interceptions by a linebacker positively correlate with player rank because of the 
increased pressure it puts on a Quarterback to make a good through, and the increased 
pressure it puts on the Receiver to create more space and separation from the linebackers 
and defensive secondary in order to make a catch in the open field after the ball is 
snapped. 
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Defensive Backs: 
The model I use to evaluate Defensive Back game performance is defined as: 
RkDB = β0WPADB + β1EPADB + β2EPA/GDB + β3TFDB + β4PDDB + β5INTDB + β6GPDB + 
β7ArrestedDB 
A new additional variable I chose to include in the Defensive Backs regression model is 
PDDB, which represents passes deflected by a Defensive Back. I predict that PDDB 
positively correlates with player rank because of the nature of the Defensive Back 
position and the added pressure pass deflections put on the Quarterback and Wide 
Receiver positions. 
 
V. Data 
 
For my individual positional data, I have compiled a data set of the top thirty 
ranked players for each individual position, for the years 2000-2014. I pulled offensive 
statistics and rankings from NFL.com, but extracted defensive statistics and rankings 
from a different rating website, AdvancedFootballAnalytics.com. My data sets only 
include regular season performance statistics because a large amount of the players in the 
top thirty lists statistics do not end up making playoffs, so it is more beneficial to not 
include playoff statistics. 
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My data includes statistics for Quarterbacks, Running Backs, Wide Receivers, 
Defensive Linemen, Linebackers, and Defensive Backs. For the Defensive Linemen 
position group, I consolidated all positions across the Defensive Line, which includes 
Defensive Ends, Nose Guards, and Defensive Tackles. I used the same method for the 
Defensive Backs position group, which includes Cornerbacks and Safeties. I used 
offensive statistics and information from the NFL’s primary website because the NFL 
constantly updates the statistics of current players, while also providing the most reliable 
and complete set of historical statistical data. I used statistical information and data from 
the Advanced Football Analytics website because it provided, in my opinion, the most 
accurate method of measuring a player’s game performance on a play-by-play basis 
rather than simply just using end of season performance results. 
For my arrest data, I manipulated and extracted criminal records and offenses 
from the NFL Arrest Database in the San Diego Tribune website. I organized my results 
and came to the conclusion that I would include any offense or criminal record that was 
worse than a simple speeding ticket. 
While extracting data from three different sources can be seen as a cause for 
concern and higher chances of disparity, I find my methods of measurement to be the 
most accurate and reliable when looking at game performance of players individually by 
position. I believe any differences or errors in my data sets are immaterial and do not 
deem my analysis and results illegitimate. 
Definitions and explanations of the variables I use are located in Tables 1 and 2 in 
the appendix. Summary statistics, as well as correlation matrices, are located in Tables 3-
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11. Tables 3 and 4 show summary statistics of all of the offensive and defensive variables 
I used in my regression models, including the number of observations, mean, standards 
deviation, as well as minimum and maximum values for each component of performance 
measurements. It is important to note that the largest standard deviation amount was 
11.49, which was found in the Quarterback position category. In all, I believe all of the 
values within the summary statistics tables are reasonable and show little major 
disparities when looking at both offensive and defensive positions.   
Tables 5 and 6 contain correlation matrices for the Quarterback position, and 
contain correlation and P-value statistics describing results and correlation significance. 
The number of observations is also noted on each table respectively. Tables 7 and 8 show 
correlation matrices for both the Running Back and Wide Receiver positions respectively, 
and contains correlation and P-value statistics describing results and correlation 
significance. Tables 9-11 show correlation matrices for all defensive positions: Defensive 
Linemen, Linebackers, and Defensive Backs respectively. While most of the positions 
had a similar total amount of observations, it is important to note that both the Defensive 
Linemen and Defensive Backs had the largest amount with a total of 900 observations 
each compared to the other positions. This could possibly lead to more accurate and 
statistically significant results overall with lower chances of outliers and components that 
could affect my analysis. I must acknowledge the fact that high correlations within all of 
my position groups could have a large impact on my regression results, but still give 
opportunities to make reasonably accurate assumptions and generalizations.   
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Tables 12-18 give regression statistics and results for each position individually. 
There were very little surprises or largely unexpected results at the offensive position, but 
it is critical to look at the defensive regression results knowing the rationale behind the 
negative values, which I have mentioned earlier in this study.   
Tables 19-24 show league-wide performance metric averages for non-arrested and 
arrested athletes in each position individually for the period 2000-2014. Each component 
used in my regression model of player performance evaluation is included in these tables. 
The last row in each of these tables should be the main area of focus when comparing 
averages of arrested and non-arrested players in the NFL during the entire 15 year period.    
Lastly, Figure 1 shows the most common criminal offenses players are arrested or 
charged with during the years 2000-2014, which leaves much room open for discussion 
in terms of how players in the NFL with a criminal arrest history carry their violent and 
aggressive behaviors off of the field. 
 
VI. Results 
 
Offensively, my results showed that being arrested had neither a positive nor 
negative impact on player performance in the NFL in the years 2000-2014. While my 
hypothesis was partly correct in the sense that an arrest record does not lead to better 
performance for offensive players, the results show that there are no statistically 
significant negative effects on offensive player game performance. 
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Defensively, my hypothesis turned out to hold true in only one position, the 
defensive line. While I believe there are varying amounts of aggression and violence 
among all defensive positions, the lack of consistency in my results could be a result of 
the constant violent interactions between offensive and Defensive Linemen play after 
play. In terms of the total number of plays a defensive player makes contact with an 
offensive player, Defensive Linemen tend to make violent contact more frequently than 
linebackers and Defensive Backs, who tend to drop into coverage more often. 
The following results were probably directly affected by the small overall number 
of players that have been arrested when comparing it to the NFL player population as a 
whole. Another possible explanation and weakness in my model could be including 
repeat offenders in my overall data set and not adjusting the total number of individual 
players with an arrest history. If I were to further analyze the arrest database and recreate 
certain elements of my models, there would end up being a higher total percentage of 
athletes who have been arrested in the past. These surprising results parallel nicely with 
the common misconceptions society has on the NFL player population, claiming arrest 
rates are higher for players than for the general public, which I discussed earlier in my 
literature review. Lastly, these results could be a result of poorly kept arrest records or 
charges that have been dropped that did not result in direct punishment, including jail or 
prison time, fines, community service, etc. It is also important to note that every 
regression model and correlation matrix containing the Rank variable are listed as 
negative values, but in reality positively correlate at different significance levels. Again, 
this is due to a rank of 1 being better than a rank of 30, even though the sum and physical 
number is smaller. 
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Quarterbacks 
Table 5 shows the correlation between various individual Quarterback performance 
measurements (including being arrested) and NFL QBR components calculated by the 
NFL.  Unfortunately, while there is a small positive correlation between being arrested 
and QBR, it is statistically insignificant given a P-value of 0.546. While my additional 
variables I chose to include in my model proved to be consistent with my initial 
correlation predictions, the results showed they were statistically insignificant in terms of 
their effects on the independent QBR variable. However, I still believe each of the 
components I discussed in my model greatly determine how successful a Quarterback is 
in the National Football League on a game-by-game basis. Overall, I found that having an 
arrest record as a Quarterback does not have a significant positive or negative impact on 
game performance. 
In terms of comparing arrested athletes to non-arrested athletes, there were very 
small differences in average QBR. In the 15 year period from 2000-2014, the average 
QBR for arrested Quarterbacks was 85.35 as opposed to a QBR rating of 84.60 of 
Quarterbacks with no criminal background during the years 2000-2014. So, there were no 
significant QBR disparities among arrested and non-arrested Quarterbacks in the NFL. 
Running Backs: 
My results shown in Table 7 contain many negative values. These are attributable 
to the idea that a higher ranking is actually represented by a lower number in my data set. 
For example, a ranking of 5 is better than a ranking of 30, even though it is 
counterintuitive in terms of looking at raw regression and correlation data at first glance. 
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I found that every variable prediction I made in measuring performance (with the 
exception of GP) proved my initial predictions correct when looking strictly at 
correlation. But, after looking at my regression results, GP surprisingly did not have a 
statistically significant impact on player rank, which could be a result of a Running Back 
having a few spectacular games that leads to higher statistical numbers that hide 
disparities in performance statistics. I also found that being arrested had a small positive 
correlation with player rank, yet still remained statistically insignificant. There was also a 
weak positive correlation between being arrested and fumbles/Attempts per game. This 
makes intuitive sense because the more fumbles you lose, the less carries your coach will 
likely give you, especially after poor ball security. Another expected result was the higher 
value of GP, the more attempts a Running Back will get per game, which in turn likely 
lead to a higher chance of higher fumble totals. However, having an arrest record has no 
significant impact on player rank or game performance for Running Backs. 
Less surprisingly however, is that on average arrested Running Backs have higher 
league averages than non-arrested Running Backs in 3 important categories: yards per 
game, total yards, and touchdowns (Tables 14-15). However, these results are small and 
do not constitute themselves as material or statistically significant differences. 
Wide Receivers: 
Shown in Table 8, there were positive correlations between Touchdowns, yards 
per game, receptions per game, and player rank. These align correctly with my previous 
regression model predictions, but show minor statistical significance. Being arrested and 
player rank have a weak positive correlation, but is statistically insignificant as well. 
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Unlike the other offensive positions in my analysis, total number of games played and 
receptions per game are strongly correlated with player rank and are statistically 
significant with a P-value of 0.00 for both, and t-scores of -17.85 and -33.29 respectively. 
Especially since the number of run plays is usually less than the total amount of pass 
plays, Wide Receivers that can maintain high reception averages are extremely valuable 
to a team. In addition, there are weak positive correlations between fumbles and games 
played variables on overall player rank, but yield no statistical significance. Similar to my 
previous offensive positional results, having an arrest record has no significant impact on 
player rank or game performance with the Wide Receiver position group. 
When looking at league-wide averages, results show that non-arrested athletes 
and arrested athletes do not have significant performance disparities (Table 14). The 
largest difference between non-arrested athletes and arrested athletes comes from the 
average yards per season component. Wide Receivers that have been arrested 
outperformed non-arrested Wide Receivers by 5% by an average of roughly 45 yards. 
However, this difference is extremely small when looking at its impact on performance 
throughout an entire season since that is nearly a difference of 4 yards per game 
throughout a 16 game regular season. 
Defensive Linemen 
Shown in table 9, WPA/EPA/EPAG all have strong positive correlations with 
player rank. Also, every independent variable within my regression model had 
statistically significant effects on player rank. In alignment with my initial prediction in 
my hypothesis, being arrested had a positive correlation with game performance (Table 
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9). Most importantly, my regression data showed statistical significance between a 
Defensive Lineman being arrested and its positive effect on game performance, given a 
p-value of 0.049 and a t-score of -1.97. My results showed that being arrested as a 
Defensive Linemen leads to higher player position rankings at the 95% confidence level. 
More specifically, being arrested as a Defensive Lineman can lead to a higher player rank 
by up to .87 points. 
One important element of my regression data to point out is the low R-squared 
value of 0.62 in comparison to my other positional regression models. This R-squared 
value means that only 0.62% of the variations in my model can be accounted for when 
looking at their effects on my dependent variables at a 95% confidence level. I believe 
that while it is in fact lower than the other regression R-Squared values by an average of 
roughly .15 points, it still partially validates my original prediction on player 
performance. This low R-squared could be a result of my decision to use models and 
calculations created by Advanced Football Analytics rather than using end of season 
statistics and averages like I did for my selected offensive positions. Many times, 
Defensive Linemen are judged more harshly on their end of year statistics, rather than on 
their true impact on a game on a play-by-play basis, which is why I put less emphasis on 
those factors. For example, many premier Defensive Linemen in the NFL are double or 
even sometimes triple teamed by offensive players, which can drastically affect and limit 
the performance metrics used by Advanced Football Analytics when looking at game 
performance only on plays a player was directly involved in. Also, a large talent gap 
exists between the 30th best Defensive Linemen and the highest ranked Defensive 
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Linemen in terms of the independent variables I used in my regression model, which 
could explain why my results were not as significant and blatant as I predicted. 
In terms of league-wide averages, arrested Defensive Linemen have better 
performance averages than non-arrested Defensive Linemen in every performance 
category used in my regression model. These categories include WPA, EPA, EPA/G, and 
TF. While there are differences, the disparities are very small and do not represent 
material differences among Defensive Linemen throughout the National Football League. 
Linebackers: 
Table 10 shows positive correlations with every dependent variable and player 
rank. There were strong positive correlations between WPA, EPA, EPA/G on Rank, 
while there were weaker positive correlations between TF, INT, GP and Arrested on 
Rank. My regression results showed no statistical significance in terms of being arrested 
and its impact on player rank given a 95% confidence level. My results show that being 
arrested does not have a significant effect on player performance or rank for the 
Linebacker position. 
When looking at league-wide averages for Linebackers, arrested players have 
better averages in a majority of the categories across the league than non-arrested players, 
including WPA, EPA, EPA/G, and INT. The biggest difference in average can be seen in 
the EPA category, where arrested Linebackers’ EPA is roughly 7.4% higher than 
Linebackers who have not been arrested. However these differences are minor and do not 
represent significant disparities among NFL Linebacker performance. 
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Defensive Backs: 
Table 11 also shows the positive correlations between every independent variable 
and overall player rank used in my performance evaluation metrics. After running the 
regression, I found that only two of the variables (WPA and TF) had statistically 
significant impacts on overall player rank, given P-values of 0.00 and 0.02 respectively. 
This proves to be consistent with my initial predictions in that Win Probability Added 
and Tackle Factor take various elements into account when determining player rank. 
While these same variables did not help the results for Defensive Linemen, I believe 
using them with the other defensive positions provides more accurate results and logical 
explanations for its values. 
My regression results proved elements of my hypothesis statement to be incorrect 
when looking at the effect being arrested had on NFL Defensive Back performance. My 
results show that being arrested has little to no statistically significant effect on player 
rank, which parallels society’s stereotype and perception of NFL athletes as well. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Society’s widespread perception and stereotyping of NFL players as thugs and 
criminals is not as accurate as one may think. This study showed that while there is an 
increased necessity in the NFL to be aggressive and violent within the confines of the 
football field, it does not necessarily carry over to off the field arrests stemming from an 
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individual player’s aggression and violence. While my study may be limited and 
tempered due to a lack of desired results and certain personal judgments, the results failed 
to show statistical significance or validity to my initial predictions supporting the idea 
that the NFL player population primarily consists of criminals. 
When comparing the NFL arrest population to the general population in the 
United States, it is clear that the NFL arrest rate is lower than the arrest rate of the general 
population by roughly 30%. I am a firm believer that media outlets greatly contribute to 
ignorant and false stereotyping of NFL players, which is something I too have been guilty 
of in the past. The figures discussed in my study are far lower than what society tends to 
believe at first glance, especially with the attention the media puts on high-profile and 
high-caliber players such as Ben Roethlisberger, Ray Rice, Michael Vick, and Aaron 
Hernandez. 
More specifically, on the offensive side of the ball, Table 3 shows that within the 
pool of athletes I chose to analyze in the years 2000-2014, only 11% of Quarterbacks, 
28% of Running Backs, and 26% of Wide Receivers in the NFL have a criminal arrest 
history. Defensively, my results show that within my specific data set regarding defensive 
athletes playing in the NFL between the years 2000-2014, 21% of Defensive Linemen, 
20% of Linebackers, and 16% of Defensive Backs has a criminal arrest history (Table 4). 
In conclusion, I found that having an arrest record as an offensive player has no 
positive or negative effect on game performance or rank. Additionally, my results proved 
my hypothesis and initial predictions to be incorrect. Defensively, having an arrest record 
only provides statistical significance at the Defensive Linemen position at a 95% level. 
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More specifically, being arrested as a Defensive Lineman has a positive effect on player 
rank, while having no effect on either the Linebacker or Defensive Back positions. 
While the NFL is constantly trying to improve its tainted image and 
misconceptions by the general public, hopefully this study will shed some light and 
provide some solid evidence clarifying these stereotypes and misconceptions. I 
acknowledge that I may have overlooked certain types of statistics and data, such as 
differentiating types of crime or only including certain positions in my models, but I 
believe this paper is a good starting point for further research and analysis if this issue 
continues to be a big problem for the NFL, or even the professional sporting world as a 
whole. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Definitions of Offensive Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Rate Quarterback Rating 
GamesPlayed Number of games an NFL player has played in during a single season 
Sck Number of times a Quarterback was sacked in a single season 
TDINT Ratio of Touchdowns Thrown to Interceptions Thrown in a single season 
PCT Quarterback Completion Percentage, equals total number of passing completions 
divided by  total number of passing attempts in a single season 
 
YPA Yards per Pass Attempt, equals a Quarterback’s total passing yards divided by total 
passing attempts in a single season 
 
TDPerct 
 
INTPerct 
Touchdown Percentage, equals number of a Quarterback’s total touchdowns divided 
by total passing attempts in a single season 
 
Interception Percentage, equals number of interceptions thrown by a Quarterback 
divided by passing attempts in a single season 
 
Arrested A dummy variable equal to 0 if a player has not been arrested and equal to 1 if the 
player has been arrested 
 
Rank Player Rank on a scale of 1-30, 1 being the best, 30 being the worst 
AttG Number of Rushing Attempts per Game by a Running Back 
YdsG Number of Total Yards per Game by either a Running Back or Wide Receiver 
 
TD Number of total touchdowns in a season by any offensive position 
FUM Number of fumbles lost in a season by a Running Back or Wide Receiver 
Rec/G Number of receptions per game by a Wide Receiver 
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Table 2 
Definitions of Defensive Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Rank 
 
WPA 
 
EPA 
 
EPAG 
 
TF  
 
GamesPlayed 
 
Arrested 
Player Rank on a scale of 1-30, 1 being the best, 30 being the worst 
 
Win Probability Added of a defensive player in the NFL 
 
Expected Points Added of a defensive player in the NFL 
 
Expected Points Added per Game of a defensive player in the NFL 
 
Tackle Factor of a defensive player in the NFL 
 
Number of games an NFL player has played in during a single season 
 
A dummy variable equal to 0 if a player has not been arrested and equal to 1 if 
the player has been arrested 
  
PD  
 
INT 
Number of pass deflections in a single season 
 
Number of interceptions in a single season 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables – Offensive Positions 
*This data is compiled from the 2000-2014 NFL seasons for all of the offensive positions I chose to analyze. Quarterbacks, Running 
Backs, and Wide Receivers are all represented in this table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Quarterbacks: 
 
Rate 
GamesPlayed 
Sck 
TDINT 
PCT 
YPA 
TDPerct  
Arrested 
 
 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
 
 
84.68 
14.24 
29.25 
1.80 
60.90 
7.08 
.04 
.11 
 
 
11.49 
2.34 
10.54 
1.37 
4.10 
.75 
.01 
.31 
 
 
56.20 
7.00 
6.00 
.44 
50.00 
5.08 
.02 
0 
 
 
122.50 
16.00 
76.00 
13.50 
71.20 
9.88 
.01 
1 
 
Running Backs: 
 
Rank 
AttG 
YdsG 
TD  
FUM  
GamesPlayed 
Arrested 
 
 
 
480 
480 
480 
480 
480 
480 
480 
 
 
15.50 
17.29 
74.52 
6.96 
2.56 
13.55 
.28 
 
 
8.66 
3.27 
16.00 
4.35 
1.87 
3.43 
.45 
 
 
1 
9.20 
44.90 
0.00 
0.00 
1 
0 
 
 
 
30 
26.00 
131.10 
28 
11 
16.00 
1 
Wide Receivers: 
 
Rank 
Rec/G 
YdsG 
TD 
FUM 
GamesPlayed 
Arrested 
 
 
 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
 
 
 
15.20 
5.18 
70.46 
7.08 
.94 
15.54 
.26 
 
 
8.59 
.94 
14.59 
3.31 
.93 
.91 
.44 
 
 
1 
3.56 
37.50 
0 
0 
10 
0 
 
 
30 
8.94 
122.80 
23 
5 
16.02 
1 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables – Defensive Positions 
*This data is compiled from the 2000-2014 NFL seasons for all of the defensive positions I chose to analyze. Defensive Linemen, 
Linebackers, and Defensive Backs are all represented in this table 
 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Defensive Linemen: 
 
Rank 
WPA 
EPA 
EPAG 
TF  
GamesPlayed 
Arrested 
 
Linebackers: 
 
Rank 
WPA  
EPA  
EPAG  
TF  
INT  
GamesPlayed 
Arrested 
 
Defensive Backs: 
 
Rank 
WPA  
EPA  
EPAG  
TF  
PD  
INT  
GamesPlayed 
Arrested 
 
 
 
 
 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
 
 
 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
450 
 
 
 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
900 
 
 
 
15.50 
1.08 
35.24 
2.398 
.85 
14.76 
.21 
 
 
 
15.50 
1.66 
52.54 
3.40 
1.11 
1.40 
15.48 
.20 
 
 
 
15.50 
1.19 
37.54 
2.49 
.88 
11.08 
3.14 
15.10 
.16 
 
 
8.66 
.36 
11.89 
.76 
.19 
1.51 
.41 
 
 
 
8.67 
.32 
10.87 
.67 
.28 
1.34 
1.38 
.40 
 
 
 
8.66 
.29 
10.12 
.66 
.21 
5.12 
1.96 
1.39 
.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.33 
11.50 
.88 
.34 
8 
0 
 
 
 
1 
1.10 
26 
1.63 
.36 
0 
9 
0 
 
 
 
1 
.74 
7.50 
.75 
.35 
1 
0 
7 
0 
 
 
 
 
30 
3.32 
122 
7.63 
1.50 
30 
1 
 
 
 
30 
2.77 
91 
5.83 
1.73 
6 
29 
1 
 
 
 
30 
2.68 
91.4 
5.71 
1.51 
31 
10 
18 
1 
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Table 5 
Quarterbacks Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rate, during the years 2000-2014 for the Quarterback Position. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*This table includes all components of NFL calculated QBR, as well as additional components I decided to include 
*Number of Observations = 450 
 
 
Rate  GamesPlayed Sck Arrested TDINT Pct YPA TDPerct INTPerct 
Rate 1.00 
        
          
          GamesPlayed 0.22 1.00 
       
 
0.00 
        
          Sck -0.07 0.33 1.00 
      
 
0.13 0.00 
       
          Arrested 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 1.00 
     
 
0.67 0.14 0.04 
      
          TDINT 0.73 0.07 -0.09 -0.02 1.00 
    
 
0.00 0.15 0.06 0.39 
     
          Pct 0.81 0.17 -0.06 0.02 0.41 1.00 
   
 
0.00 0.00 0.24 0.61 0.00 
    
          YPA 0.84 0.09 -0.08 0.05 0.51 0.66 1.00 
  
 
0.00 0.07 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 
   
          TDPerct 0.84 0.18 -0.13 0.00 0.63 0.57 0.72 1.00 
 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
          INTPerct -0.65 -0.21 -0.21 0.00 -0.67 -0.36 -0.31 -0.31 1.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.35 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
47 
 
Table 6 
QBR Individual Component Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rate, during the years 2000-2014 for the Quarterback Position. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*This table includes only the components QBR used by the NFL 
*Number of Observations = 450 
 
 
Rate  Arrested Pct YPA TDPerct INTPerct    
Rate 1.00 
    
    
      
    
      
    
Arrested 0.02 1.00 
   
    
 
0.67 
    
    
      
    
Pct 0.81 0.23 1.00 
  
    
 
0.00 0.61 
   
    
      
    
YPA 0.84 0.05 0.66 1.00 
 
    
 
0.00 0.30 0.00 
  
    
      
    
TDPerct 0.84 0.00 0.57 0.72 1.00     
 
0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 
 
    
      
    
INTPct -0.65 0.00 -0.36 -0.31 -0.31 1.00    
 
0.00 -0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
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Table 7 
Running Backs Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rank, during the years 2000-2014 for the Running Back Position. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*Number of Observations = 480 
 
 Rank AttG YdsG TD FUM GamesPlayed Arrested 
  Rank 1.00 
        
                    
AttG -0.73 1.00 
       
 
0.00 
        
          YdsG -0.92 0.80 1.00 
      
 
0.00 0.00 
       
          TD -0.47 0.43 0.53 1.00 
     
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
          FUM -0.24 0.36 0.29 0.23 1.00 
    
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
          GamesPlayed -0.21 0.21 0.22 0.52 0.41 1.00 
   
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
          Arrested -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.51 0.00 1.00 
  
 
0.42 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.97 
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Table 8 
Wide Receivers Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rank, during the years for the Wide Receiver Position. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*Number of Observations = 450 
 
 
Rank RecG YdsG TD FUM GamesPlayed Arrested 
  Rank 1.00 
         
          
         RecG -0.87 1.00 
        0.00 
         
         YdsG -0.68 0.73 1.00 
       0.00 0.00 
        
         TD -0.36 0.32 0.54 1.00 
      0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
         FUM -0.15 0.16 0.16 0.06 1.00 
     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 
      
         GamesPlayed -0.20 -0.15 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 1.00 
    0.00 0.00 0.56 0.03 0.56 
     
         Arrested -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.85 0.05 0.04 1.00 
   0.54 1.00 0.12 0.07 0.32 0.39 
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Table 9 
Defensive Linemen Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Rank WPA EPA EPAG TF GamesPlayed Arrested 
  Rank 1.00 
        
 
         
 
         WPA -0.76 1.00 
       
 0.00 
        
 
         EPA -0.59 0.83 1.00 
      
 0.00 0.00 
       
 
         EPAG -0.57 0.80 0.95 1.00 
     
 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
 
         TF -0.32 0.24 0.27 0.27 1.00 
    
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
 
         GamesPlayed -0.17 0.20 0.29 -0.01 0.04 1.00 
   
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.28 
    
 
         Arrested -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
  
 0.16 0.82 0.85 0.07 0.61 0.28 
   
 
         
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rank, during the years 2000-2014 for the Defensive Lineman Position. (Defensive Definitions can be found in Table 2) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*Number of Observations = 900 
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Table 10 
Linebacker Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rank, during the years 2000-2014 NFL for the Linebacker Position. (Defensive Definitions can be found in Table 2) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*Number of Observations = 450 
 
 Rank WPA EPA EPAG TF Int GamesPlayed Arrested 
 Rank 1.00 
 
  
      
 
         
 
         WPA -0.88 1.00 
       
 0.00 
        
 
         EPA -0.54 0.64 1.00 
      
 0.00 0.00 
       
 
         EPAG -0.50 0.59 0.89 1.00 
     
 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
 
         TF -0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 1.00  
   
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
 
         Int -0.22 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.18 1.00  
  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
   
 
         GamesPlayed -0.15 0.18 0.33 -0.12 0.01 0.03 1.00  
 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.48 0.00 
  
 
         Arrested -0.05 0.05 0.14 0.13 -0.10 -0.01 0.04 1.00 
 
 
0.29 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.89 0.44 
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Table 11 
Defensive Back Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data shows the correlations between all of my dependent variables used in my regression model and the independent variable, 
Rank, during the years 2000-2014 for the Defensive Backs position. (Defensive Definitions can be found in Table 2) 
*P-Value Significance is listed directly below the correlation value  
*Number of Observations = 900 
 
 
  Rank WPA EPA EPAG TF PD Int GamesPlayed Arrested 
Rank 1.00 
        
 
         
 
         WPA -0.86 1.00 
       
 0.00 
        
 
         EPA -0.61 0.68 1.00 
      
 0.00 0.00 
       
 
         EPAG -0.54 0.62 0.92 1.00 
     
 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
 
         TF -0.15 0.10 0.19 0.17 1.00  
   
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
 
         PD -0.26 0.33 0.45 0.39 -0.30 1.00  
  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
   
 
         Int -0.32 0.37 0.54 0.53 -0.21 0.52 1.00  
 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
  
 
         GamesPlayed -0.18 0.16 0.25 -0.13 0.09 0.17 0.05 1.00 
 
 
0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 
  
          Arrested 0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
 
0.03 0.10 0.97 0.64 0.27 0.14 0.59 0.24 
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Table 12 
Quarterback Regression Data – All Components 
 
R2 = 1.000 
Adjusted R2 = 1.000 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
GamesPlayed 0.00063 0.71 0.478 
Sck -0.00006 -0.32 0.749 
Arrested 0.00362 0.60 0.546 
TDINT -0.00114 -0.49 0.626 
Pct 0.83371 1347.84 0.000 
YPA 4.16428 1057.96 0.000 
TDPerct 333.35070 1312.05 0.000 
INTPerct -416.70570 -1493.60 0.000 
Constant 2.07318 56.92 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Quarterback Position during the years 2000-2014, the independent 
variable being Rate. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*Number of Observations = 450 
*Dependent Variable Regression effects on Rate (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
*R2 values of 1.000 at first glance may seem unusual, but can be attributed to variable selection. Components of QBR should lead to 
an R2 value of 1.000 since they are what make up the calculation of QBR. The other variables, which include GamesPlayed, Sck, 
Arrested, and TDINT will have no regression effect on Rate since the NFL does not account for these factors when calculating its 
QBR value.  
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Table 13 
Quarterback Regression Data – Individual QBR Components 
 
R2 = 1.000 
Adjusted R2 = 1.000 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
Arrested 0.00362 0.61 0.541 
Pct 0.83378 1362.66 0.000 
YPA 4.16376 1071.47 0.000 
TDPerct 333.32550 1550.95 0.000 
INTPerct -416.63620 -2035.95 0.000 
Constant 2.07643 61.93 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Quarterback Position during the years 2000-2014, the independent 
variable being Rate. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*Only includes QBR components used by the NFL 
*Number of Observations = 450 
*Dependent Variable Effects on Rate (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
*R2 values of 1.000 at first glance may seem unusual, but can be attributed to variable selection. Components of QBR should lead to 
an R2 value of 1.000 since they are what make up the calculation of QBR. The other variables, which include GamesPlayed, Sck, 
Arrested, and TDINT will have no regression effect on Rate since the NFL does not account for these factors when calculating its 
QBR value. 
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Table 14 
Running Backs Regression Data 
 
R2 = 0.8573 
 Adjusted R2 = 0.8554 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Running Back Position during the years 2000-2014, the independent 
variable being Rank. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*Number of Observations = 480 
*Dependent Variable Regression effects on Rank (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
AttG -0.02083 -0.27 0.790 
YdsG -0.51424 -30.80 0.000 
TD 0.10177 2.17 0.031 
FUM 0.19257 2.07 0.039 
GamesPlayed -0.08968 -1.64 0.103 
Arrested 0.18935 0.55 0.580 
Constant  54.13264 51.27 0.000 
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Table 15 
Wide Receivers Regression Data 
 
R2 = 0.8623 
Adjusted R2 = 0.8605 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Wide Receiver Position during the years 2000-2014, the independent 
variable being Rank. (Offensive Definitions can be found in Table 1) 
*Number of Observations = 450 
*Dependent Variable Regression effects on Rank (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
RecG -8.11102 -33.29 0.000 
YdsG -0.01486 -0.85 0.394 
TD -0.07682 -1.39 0.165 
FUM -0.13480 -0.81 0.417 
GamesPlayed -3.02713 -17.85 0.000 
Arrested -0.20958 -0.61 0.544 
Constant  106.05050 36.85 0.000 
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Table 16 
Defensive Linemen Regression Data  
 
R2 = 0.6179  
Adjusted R2 = 0.6153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Defensive Linemen Position during the years 2000-2014, the 
independent variable being Rank. (Defensive Definitions can be found in Table 2) 
*Number of Observations = 900 
*Dependent Variable Regression effects on Rank (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
WPA -21.06294 -23.54 0.000 
EPA 0.46414 3.17 0.002 
EPAG -4.78076 -2.20 0.028 
TF -7.41966 -7.63 0.000 
GamesPlayed -0.99882 -2.76 0.006 
Arrested -0.87030 -1.97 0.049 
Constant  54.61403 9.93 0.000 
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Table 17 
Linebackers Regression Data 
 
R2 = 0.7701 
Adjusted R2 = 0.7665 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Linebackers Position during the years 2000-2014, the independent 
variable being Rank. (Defensive Definitions can be found in Table 2) 
*Number of Observations = 450 
*Dependent Variable Regression effects on Rank (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
WPA -24.30530 -29.86 0.000 
EPA 0.28249 1.62 0.105 
EPAG -4.07542 -1.53 0.128 
TF -1.04528 -1.42 0.155 
Int 0.15565 0.96 0.339 
GamesPlayed -0.92270 -1.49 0.136 
Arrested -0.26645 -0.53 0.595 
Constant  70.21381 7.33 0.000 
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Table 18 
Defensive Backs Regression Data  
 
R2 = 0.7475 
Adjusted R2 = 0.7452 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This data contains results from my regression model for the Defensive Backs Position during the years 2000-2014, the independent 
variable being Rank. (Defensive Definitions can be found in Table 2) 
*Number of Observations = 900 
*Dependent Variable Regression effects on Rank (independent variable) at a 95% confidence level 
Variable Coefficient T-Score P-Value 
WPA -24.70767 -36.21 0.000 
EPA 0.72297 0.62 0.538 
EPAG -1.40615 -0.82 0.414 
TF -1.88893 -2.32 0.021 
PD 0.04895 1.32 0.186 
Int -0.11255 -1.13 0.257 
GamesPlayed -0.52290 -1.56 0.119 
Arrested 0.53693 1.35 0.177 
Constant  55.07853 10.91 0.000 
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Table 19 
Quarterback League-Wide Averages 
Arrested? No 
  Year QBR Avg 
2000 80.01 
2001 78.53 
2002 84.07 
2003 77.69 
2004 86.01 
2005 83.58 
2006 83.37 
2007 85.76 
2008 84.95 
2009 84.64 
2010 86.20 
2011 85.31 
2012 87.38 
2013 89.58 
2014 89.77 
Period avg 84.60 
 
Arrested? Yes 
  Year QBR Avg 
2000 89.54 
2001 85.28 
2002 79.63 
2003 92.03 
2004 89.54 
2005 81.78 
2006 73.43 
2007 82.13 
2008 91.45 
2009 90.70 
2010 96.10 
2011 90.85 
2012 84.40 
2013 73.00 
Period avg 85.35 
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Table 20 
Running Back League-Wide Averages 
Arrested? No 
        Year Avg of Att/G Avg of Yds/G Avg of FUM Avg of TD 
2000 17.96 76.03 2.66 6.39 
2001 18.11 76.88 2.33 5.24 
2002 16.98 72.32 2.43 8.29 
2003 17.10 73.36 2.30 7.35 
2004 19.41 82.20 3.27 8.68 
2005 18.92 80.99 2.23 8.41 
2006 18.02 77.40 2.78 7.52 
2007 16.92 73.81 2.10 6.40 
2008 16.92 73.81 2.10 6.40 
2009 15.72 68.32 2.05 7.25 
2010 15.63 70.48 2.52 6.71 
2011 15.96 75.09 1.90 5.45 
2012 16.89 73.19 2.68 6.21 
2013 15.65 67.71 2.00 5.58 
2014 15.08 66.00 1.76 5.96 
Period avg 17.07 73.92 2.36 6.77 
 
 
Arrested? Yes 
        Year Avg of Att/G Avg Yds/G Avg of FUM Avg of TD 
2000 18.16 73.93 3.94 7.44 
2001 17.30 67.34 4.22 6.44 
2002 19.69 84.01 4.78 9.22 
2003 22.40 100.53 6.00 9.00 
2004 17.96 80.15 3.75 7.38 
2005 17.45 71.10 2.63 6.63 
2006 19.16 81.30 2.71 8.29 
2007 17.49 75.70 2.30 6.10 
2008 17.49 75.70 2.30 6.10 
2009 17.09 77.97 2.60 8.80 
2010 17.54 74.99 2.89 7.33 
2011 16.70 70.43 2.20 8.40 
2012 16.41 71.69 2.45 7.09 
2013 17.28 71.57 1.67 8.00 
2014 15.78 69.44 0.20 5.00 
Period avg 17.82 76.04 3.07 7.44 
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Table 21 
Wide Receiver League-Wide Averages 
Arrested? No 
      
Year 
Avg 
of 
Yds/G 
Avg of 
FUM 
Avg of 
TD 
Avg of 
Rec 
Avg of 
Yds 
Avg of 
Avg 
Avg of 
Rec/G 
2000 69.94 1.13 6.78 78.48 1104.87 14.02 4.90 
2001 69.58 0.96 7.13 80.75 1104.46 13.78 5.05 
2002 71.88 0.81 6.38 85.67 1118.62 13.12 5.35 
2000 65.93 0.76 6.52 75.71 1020.86 13.41 4.73 
2004 71.33 1.23 8.18 79.41 1116.41 14.08 4.96 
2005 69.46 0.94 6.24 81.47 1052.88 12.83 5.09 
2006 67.86 0.63 6.46 79.25 1054.88 13.33 4.95 
2007 68.20 1.33 6.29 82.52 1041.14 12.67 5.16 
2008 67.50 0.95 6.48 80.14 1057.52 13.32 5.01 
2009 68.81 1.25 6.55 76.55 1056.30 13.95 4.78 
2010 66.04 0.73 7.77 76.91 1006.68 13.17 4.81 
2011 70.61 0.48 7.00 75.67 1092.19 14.41 4.73 
2012 70.12 1.00 7.13 82.00 1099.50 13.35 5.13 
2013 73.22 0.72 6.80 83.36 1135.60 13.60 5.21 
2014 75.31 0.92 7.60 84.88 1147.80 13.46 5.31 
Period avg 69.82 0.92 6.91 80.27 1082.72 13.51 5.01 
Arrested? Yes 
      
Year 
Avg 
of 
Yds/G 
Avg of 
FUM 
Avg of 
TD 
Avg of 
Rec 
Avg of 
Yds 
Avg of 
Avg 
Avg of 
Rec/G 
2000 76.53 0.86 8.29 84.14 1213.00 14.53 5.26 
2001 79.67 0.83 7.83 94.17 1259.67 13.58 5.89 
2002 71.61 0.89 6.33 81.78 1132.44 14.08 5.11 
2003 69.08 0.89 8.11 79.67 1078.22 13.52 4.98 
2004 70.04 1.00 7.75 76.25 1093.75 14.39 4.77 
2005 71.04 0.77 7.62 76.77 1127.62 14.70 4.80 
2006 73.38 0.83 7.33 73.17 1100.33 15.10 4.57 
2007 74.58 1.33 10.11 83.78 1167.00 13.88 5.24 
2008 73.71 1.44 6.44 79.89 1119.22 14.04 4.99 
2009 70.90 1.00 7.90 83.10 1112.60 13.62 5.19 
2010 63.86 1.00 6.50 76.75 975.75 12.84 4.80 
2011 66.11 1.11 5.44 73.56 1043.67 14.13 4.60 
2012 79.83 1.00 7.83 85.17 1277.33 15.22 5.32 
2013 83.62 0.80 9.40 92.60 1290.80 14.20 5.79 
2014 69.38 1.60 7.00 81.80 1056.00 12.98 5.11 
Period avg 72.25 1.02 7.55 80.82 1128.19 14.06 5.09 
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Table 22 
Defensive Linemen League-Wide Averages 
Arrested? No 
   Year Avg of WPA Avg of EPA Avg of EPA/G Avg of TF 
2000 1.13 34.55 2.33 0.91 
2001 1.05 33.40 2.34 0.90 
2002 1.12 36.75 2.49 0.88 
2003 1.00 33.26 2.26 0.88 
2004 1.11 33.75 2.34 0.88 
2005 1.09 35.22 2.41 0.88 
2006 1.18 38.60 2.57 0.84 
2007 1.18 37.99 2.48 0.85 
2008 1.07 35.43 2.38 0.82 
2009 1.00 32.77 2.25 0.76 
2010 0.97 33.38 2.28 0.81 
2011 1.06 35.05 2.36 0.84 
2012 1.07 36.05 2.41 0.81 
2013 1.14 36.13 2.40 0.84 
2014 1.08 36.22 2.47 0.79 
Period avg 1.08 35.20 2.38 0.85 
 
 
Arrested? Yes 
   Year Avg of WPA Avg of EPA Avg of EPA/G Avg of TF 
2000 1.02 32.88 2.24 0.95 
2001 1.02 31.34 2.15 0.87 
2002 1.01 33.56 2.28 0.83 
2003 1.04 35.96 2.56 0.87 
2004 1.23 38.42 2.82 0.93 
2005 1.12 36.05 2.38 0.87 
2006 1.23 41.51 2.69 0.85 
2007 1.06 34.89 2.49 0.83 
2008 1.09 34.44 2.25 0.88 
2009 1.12 36.73 2.52 0.84 
2010 1.08 34.38 2.31 0.84 
2011 0.94 33.34 2.21 0.80 
2012 1.04 33.56 2.41 0.87 
2013 1.29 39.98 2.68 0.89 
2014 1.03 32.65 2.21 0.73 
Period Avg 1.09 35.39 2.42 0.86 
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Table 23 
Linebacker League-Wide Averages 
Arrested? No 
    
Year 
Avg of 
WPA 
Avg of 
EPA Avg of EPA/G Avg of TF Avg of Int 
2000 1.68 50.73 3.34 1.13 1.62 
2001 1.71 52.68 3.46 1.16 1.46 
2002 1.75 53.61 3.39 1.14 1.41 
2003 1.66 52.03 3.39 1.14 1.33 
2004 1.64 51.08 3.37 1.09 1.58 
2005 1.54 49.95 3.24 1.17 1.24 
2006 1.70 53.15 3.45 1.09 1.32 
2007 1.77 54.08 3.48 1.11 1.85 
2008 1.49 47.07 3.03 1.05 0.85 
2009 1.68 51.20 3.35 1.07 1.20 
2010 1.74 53.63 3.41 1.09 1.00 
2011 1.62 50.41 3.19 1.14 1.53 
2012 1.61 49.27 3.17 1.16 1.55 
2013 1.82 59.56 3.87 1.19 2.26 
2014 1.40 46.50 3.14 1.11 0.78 
Period Avg 1.65 51.76 3.36 1.12 1.40 
 
Arrested? Yes 
    
Year 
Avg of 
WPA Avg of EPA Avg of EPA/G Avg of TF Avg of Int 
2000 1.56 53.05 3.41 1.05 1.00 
2001 1.68 60.33 3.93 1.03 1.25 
2002 1.38 64.20 4.01 0.93 4.00 
2003 1.75 56.63 3.82 1.11 2.67 
2004 1.60 52.57 3.36 1.04 1.50 
2005 1.76 63.28 4.09 1.24 2.20 
2006 1.74 57.29 3.71 1.15 1.75 
2007 1.65 56.42 3.66 1.11 1.20 
2008 1.70 56.94 3.59 1.07 1.80 
2009 1.72 56.16 3.32 0.99 0.90 
2010 1.93 60.03 3.57 1.01 1.17 
2011 1.78 52.70 3.46 1.01 0.91 
2012 1.72 53.83 3.54 0.97 1.25 
2013 1.65 50.30 3.73 1.23 1.67 
2014 1.17 39.70 3.00 0.86 0.33 
Period Avg 1.69 55.58 3.57 1.05 1.38 
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Table 24 
Defensive Back League-Wide Averages 
Arrested? No 
     
Year 
Avg of 
WPA 
Avg of 
EPA 
Avg of 
EPA/G 
Avg of 
TF 
Avg of 
PD 
Avg of 
Int 
2000 1.25 40.43 2.64 0.90 10.92 3.63 
2001 1.19 36.76 2.40 0.84 11.65 3.67 
2002 1.21 35.63 2.40 0.88 10.75 2.93 
2003 1.25 38.79 2.53 0.90 11.13 3.09 
2004 1.33 40.58 2.66 0.89 11.52 3.66 
2005 1.26 38.22 2.55 0.89 11.71 3.29 
2006 1.29 41.15 2.73 0.85 12.28 3.63 
2007 1.15 37.05 2.45 0.87 10.54 3.20 
2008 1.20 38.62 2.54 0.87 10.75 2.94 
2009 1.16 37.02 2.48 0.87 10.70 3.20 
2010 1.25 38.66 2.62 0.92 10.52 2.85 
2011 1.11 34.40 2.27 0.87 11.13 2.71 
2012 1.16 36.51 2.43 0.92 10.83 3.00 
2013 1.19 36.12 2.39 0.83 10.84 2.71 
2014 1.04 34.15 2.31 0.88 9.42 2.54 
Period Avg 1.20 37.54 2.49 0.88 10.97 3.12 
 
Arrested? Yes 
     
Year 
Average 
of WPA 
Average 
of EPA 
Average of 
EPA/G 
Average 
of TF 
Average 
of PD 
Average 
of Int 
2000 1.24 41.26 2.66 0.80 13.73 4.45 
2001 1.07 33.70 2.23 0.83 10.64 2.55 
2002 1.04 34.60 2.29 0.80 12.40 3.00 
2003 1.27 42.61 2.87 0.88 13.23 4.15 
2004 1.08 34.54 2.32 0.91 10.50 2.69 
2005 1.16 37.64 2.48 0.81 12.56 3.11 
2006 1.21 35.84 2.29 0.85 10.43 2.71 
2007 1.12 33.87 2.29 0.89 10.57 2.71 
2008 1.19 38.77 2.73 0.86 13.00 3.44 
2009 1.17 46.12 3.01 0.81 16.17 5.67 
2010 1.33 42.20 2.82 0.93 9.50 3.33 
2011 0.99 37.63 2.60 0.82 12.25 3.00 
2012 1.17 39.90 2.96 0.94 10.57 3.29 
2013 1.46 39.72 2.58 0.87 9.40 2.80 
2014 1.02 34.09 2.29 0.84 11.17 2.58 
Period Avg 1.16 37.57 2.52 0.86 11.65 3.22 
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Figure 1 
 
 
*Diagram created by Neil Irwin of the New York Times 
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